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COMMENT
Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic
of China
By Yu XINGZHONG*
INTRODUCTION
Soon after its inception in 1949, the government of the People's
Republic of China (PRO) abolished the old Nationalist laws and
began building a socialist legal system. The new government rejected
Nationalist legal theory, along with its laws, and sought to develop a
new "socialist legality" to serve the needs of a socialist country. This
process entailed a large-scale borrowing from the Soviet model. At
the same time, it involved a campaign of criticism aimed at Western
legal thought, especially American legal pragmatism,' which was
associated by many PRC theorists with bankrupt Nationalist legal
theory.2 The subsequent development and reputed implementation of
a socialist legal theory in China has been molded by a series of polit-
ical upheavals, economic drives, and cultural movements.3 The final
* Lecturer in Law, Northwest Institute of Politics and Law, Xi'an, People's Republic of
China; visiting scholar, Columbia University School of Law, 1988-89. The author would like
to express special gratitude to the Center for Chinese Legal Studies and the United Board for
Christian Higher Education in China for their support and to Mimi Levy for her research
assistance.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 5-7.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 14-27.
3. Chinese history since 1949 has been marked by successive political, economic and
cultural movements. The most significant movements include: the "Three-Anti Campaign"
against corruption, decay, and bureaucracy (1952); the "Five-Anti Campaign" against bribery,
tax evasion, theft of state assets, and theft of state economic secrets (1952); the "Hundred
Flowers Movement," an attempt to regain the support of intellectuals (1956); the ideological
"Anti-Rightist Movement" (1957); the "Great Leap Forward," a combination of economic
and technological reforms (1958); and the "Cultural Revolution" (1965-1976). Sce generally
A. BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(1967); J. TOWNSEND & F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST
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product of this process is what is commonly called Chinese Marxist
legal theory.4
The meaning and practical application of this theory, however, is
far from evident. Recently, the PRC has again embarked on an eco-
nomic and political renewal, re-introducing many of the capitalist
legal structures and concepts that the early reformers sought to eradi-
cate. Chinese legal theory is again in turmoil. Conservative Marxist
legal theorists cling dogmatically to ideas that have proved sterile,
even to the extent of justifying current reforms as consistent with
Marxist doctrine. In reality, pragmatism dominates the approach of
both conservatives and reformers alike.
An examination of the development of legal theory over the past
40 years reveals that part of the failure to develop a comprehensive
and workable legal theory upon which a stable legal order can be built
stems itself from the adoption by Chinese leaders of many of the ten-
ets of the pragmatic approach to law that they had scorned in the
early years. This commentary traces the development of legal theory
in the PRC and attempts to give a new and critical evaluation of that
theory. By way of conclusion, it points out the negative consequences
of Chinese legal pragmatism and suggests a balance between pragma-
tism and the development of a stable legal order in China.
I. FOUNDATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF LEGAL PRAGMATISM
IN CHINA
The Chinese approach to legal pragmatism bears little or no
direct relation to Western or American legal pragmatism, as defined
below. Instead, as used in this commentary, it describes a guiding
concept peculiar to the Chinese legal system and Chinese legal philos-
ophy. This concept is manifest in a number of aspects of the current
legal system in the PRC, including: the resort to ad hoc legal meas-
ures, the separation of legal doctrine from practice, the overemphasis
on instrumental facets of law, and the placement of policy before law.
An analysis of these and other aspects of contemporary legal
pragmatism in China requires a brief background in two areas. First,
CHINA (2d ed. 1968); R. NORTH, CHINESE COMMUNISM (1966); Chen Shouyi, Zhongguo
Faxue Sanshinian, in ZHONGGUO FAXUE WENJI (Collected Works on Chinese Law) 14
(1984).
4. Although there are different versions of Marxist legal theory, Chinese legal scholars
accept only the classical or conventional theory. Classical theory is the basis of their efforts to
combine the general principles of Marxism with the conditions specific to China. The thought
of Andrei Y. Vyshinsky reflects the classical theory well. See infra text accompanying notes
28-35. For a discussion of the different versions of Soviet legal theory, see H. KELSEN, Tii.
COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (1955).
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although Western legal pragmatism as it developed in the United
States differs from Chinese legal pragmatism, a comparison of the two
enhances an understanding of the special characteristics of the Chi-
nese approach. Second, because of its continuing influence, a look at
traditional Chinese legal concepts is helpful.
A. Pragmatism in the West
Pragmatism, which began in the United States in the 1800s as an
attack on traditional formalism, is a philosophy based on the belief
that the truth, meaning, or value of ideas must be judged by their
practical consequences rather than by a set of formalized, rigid, and
timeless standards. 5 Legal pragmatism is an extension of philosophi-
cal pragmatism into the legal field. According to one legal historian,
legal pragmatism began with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
explored "the process of thinking and inquiry which terminates in a
rule or principle of law and upon the social facts, ideas, and beliefs
which are 'the life of the law.' "6 Roscoe Pound, the influential for-
mer dean of the Harvard Law School, also contributed greatly to the
school of legal pragmatism. Pound associated pragmatism with "the
adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human conditions they
are to govern rather than to assumed first principles" and called for
"putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to
its true position as an instrument."7
B. Traditional Concepts of Law
Ancient China had a very powerful legal tradition, whose sub-
stance and uninterrupted history have been extensively discussed by
both Chinese and Western scholars.' The ancient Chinese valued
social harmony and believed that an ideal society did not require
extensive legislation or litigation. Traditional Chinese moralism was
embodied in the ruler who had responsibility for maintaining har-
mony. This moralism consisted of social norms that governed the
5. For a discussion of legal pragmatism, see F- PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND
IDEAS OF THE LAW 465-500 (1953); R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 22-6 (1982); Patterson, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, in THE PHILoso-
PHER OF THE COMMON MAN 172 (1940).
6. Patterson, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, supra note 5, at 174-175, quoting 0. W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LA\V (1881). Holmes' only book, THE CaOMMoN LAW, is regarded
as a classic in the literature of pragmatic legal theory. Holmes' famous saying in this book,
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience," is regarded as at the core of
legal pragmatism. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 504; R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 24.
7. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609-10 (1908).
8. See generally D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967); Qu
TONGZU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961).
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relationships between people, thus ensuring continuing harmony. 9
Law was an instrument of last resort. It was used by the emperors
solely to maintain the hierarchal order by punishing criminals and
deterring common people from crime.' 0
Ancient China had only criminal law. All legal transgressions
were handled with criminal punishment. 1 Commoners feared law
and legal institutions. They knew that when they violated the law
they would be punished; but they did not think of law as something
that could protect civil interests. Many assumed that a court sum-
mons, whatever its origin, was an indication of guilt. Law was not
directed at the good, people believed; instead, its only purpose was to
deter the potentially evil. 2 Thus the well-known proverb: "Law is
meant for a base person but not for a gentleman (fa bei xiaoren bu
fangjunzi)." In short, law, in its limited form, was primarily a tool for
dominance, not for protection of natural rights or individual interests.
The introduction of Western civilization into China during the
18th and 19th centuries resulted in significant changes within the
political, economic and cultural structures of society. The preexisting
social order was destroyed by several major political upheavals, and
the legal tradition that was part of that social order was dismantled.
Traditional notions at the heart of ancient Chinese law, however,
remain influential today.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL THEORY IN THE PRC
The initial post-1949 development of Chinese legal theory con-
sisted of two prominent movements: the first movement criticized
Nationalist legal theory, and the second promoted a large-scale adop-
tion of Soviet legal theory. This section will briefly review these two
movements.
A. Criticism of Nationalist Legal Theory
After the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and prior to the
Communist takeover in 1949, the ruling Nationalists abrogated tradi-
9. See generally id.
10. See Liang Zhiping, Zhongguo Fa de Guoqu, Xianzai yu Weilai: Yige Wenhua de
Jiantao, BIJAOFA YANJIU, June 1987, at 17, 19-20.
11. For discussions on traditional Chinese legal procedure, see ZHou Mi, ZHONGGUO
XINGPA SHI (A History of Chinese Criminal Law) 6 (1985); QIAO WEi, TANGLO YANJIU (A
Study of Tang Codes) 504-514 (1985); ZHANG JINFAN, ZHONGGUO FAZHIl SHIGANG (An Out-
line History of the Chinese Legal System) 201-303 (1985); Li JING, QINGLO TONOGLLN (A
Survey of Qing Codes) 405-514 (1985).
12. Mu Pingren, Yu Youren Lun Fazhi Xiandaihua Shu, BIJIAOFA YANJIU, June 1987,
at 39, 42.
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tional Chinese law remaining from imperial times, and enacted a new
body of law based largely on European-style civil law. The primary
models were the French, German, and Japanese civil codes. 13
Although the new legal structure was based on civil law, the Nation-
alists also invited American legal experts, including Roscoe Pound
and others, to give advice on various aspects of legal theory. When
the Communists took over in 1949 and embarked on various political
and economic reforms, all bourgeois Western ideas, including West-
ern law and legal theory, were severely criticized.
In February 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued
"Instructions" ordering the abrogation and criticism of Nationalist
laws.4 These Instructions stated:
The judicial organs should educate and transform the judi-
cial cadres with a spirit that holds in contempt and criticizes
the Six Laws of the Nationalists and all reactionary laws
and regulations, and holds in contempt and criticizes all the
anti-people laws and regulations of bourgeois countries in
Europe, America and Japan. To accomplish this aim, they
should study and master the concepts of state and law of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and new
democratic policies, programmatic principles, laws, orders,
regulations and decisions.15
This excerpt demonstrates that the objects of contempt and targets of
criticism were not only the "anti-people" laws of the Nationalists, but
also those of Japan, the United States, and European countries.
Although the Instructions did not directly criticize preexisting legal
theory, since laws and regulations are presumably formulated with
the guidance of theory, criticism of Nationalist laws and regulations
implies criticism of the underlying theory. "Anti-people" laws of
bourgeois countries, moreover, stemmed from a bourgeois theoretical
basis and would therefore also be subject to criticism in accordance
with the Instructions.
13. FAXUE JICHU LILUN (Basic Theory of Jurisprudence) 164 (1984).
14. Zhongguo Zhongyang Guanyu Feichu Guomindang de Liufa Quanshu yu Queding
Jiefangqu Sifa Yuanze de Zhishi (Instructions of the Chinese Communist Party Central Com-
mittee Relating to Abolishing the Complete Six Laws of the Guomindang and Establishing
Judicial Principles for the Liberated Areas) (1949), reprinted in 2 FAXE LILUN XUE-XI
CHANKAO ZILIAO (Reference Materials for the Study of Jurisprudential Legal Theory) 1
(1983) [hereinafter Instructions]. The Complete Six Codes of the KMT include the Constitu-
tion, the Civil Code and its related laws, the Code of Civil Procedure and its related laws, the
code of Criminal Procedure and its related laws, the Administrative Laws, and the Military
Laws.
15. Id
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After the CCP issued the Instructions, the political leadership
initiated a campaign within Chinese legal circles in the 1950s to criti-
cize the "old theory" of the Nationalists.16 The objects of criticism
included Western constitutionalism, the doctrine of separation of
powers, judicial discretion, and presumption of innocence.' 7 Many
scholars focused their criticism on American pragmatic legal theory
because they associated it with the legal philosophy of the National-
ists. Moreover, pragmatism was regarded by Marxist critics at that
time as representative of the most reactionary of bourgeois legal theo-
ries. In the campaign against "old theory," scholars who were targets
of criticism included Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and the
Chinese intellectual Hu Shi, who was responsible for introducing
pragmatism into the Chinese intellectual arena.' 8
In 1947, the Nationalist Ministry of Justice invited Pound to
China to serve as a legal adviser.19 He delivered three lectures on law
in Nanjing and submitted to the Ministry of Justice a five-part pro-
gram for improving the administration of justice.20 Despite the fact
that it is difficult to point to specific aspects of Nationalist law influ-
enced directly by Pound and other legal pragmatists, in the minds of
Marxist critics, their influence was considerable. For instance, one
Marxist critic said, "The soul of Pound once occupied a significant
position in the Chinese forum; his evil hands once made their way
into the heart of China."2
It is interesting to note, however, that despite the Chinese view,
Pound did not promote the direct adoption of Western legal princi-
ples in China. Instead, he argued that the Chinese should experiment
with Chinese materials for solutions to Chinese problems.22 Pound's
view actually supports the policy, later frequently stressed by Chinese
16. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
17. See Yan Jingyao, Zichan Jieji Xianfa de Xugouxingyu Wei, ZHENGFA YANJIU Feb.
1954, at 14; Kang Shuhua, Zichan Jieji Sanquan Fenli Xueshuo de Xugouxing he Fandongxing,
ZHENGFA YANJIU, June 1959, at 47; Zhang Zipei, Pipan Zichan Jieji Faguan Ziyou Yuanze,
ZHENGFA YANJIU, Feb. 1958, at 42; Wu Ningsu, Pipan Zichan Jieji "Wuzui Tuiding" Yuanze,
ZHENGFA YANJIU, Jan. 1955, at 49.
18. See Li Da, Hu Shi de Zhengzhi Sixiang Pipan, ZHENGFA YANJIU, Jan. 1955, at 49;
Yang Yuqing, Pang De, Shiyong Zhuyi Faxue zai Zhongguo de Chuanbozhe, ZHENGFA
YANJIU Mar. 1955, at 13. See generally ZHONGGUO JINDAI ZHUMING ZHEXUEJIA
PINGZHUAN (A Critical Biography of China's Famous Modem Philosophers) 693 (Ding
Guanzhi & Xiao Wanyuan eds. 1983).
19. D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND 277-78 (1974).
20. The three lectures were published under the title "Law and the Administration of
Justice" by the Sino-American Cultural Service in 1947. For a description of his five-part
program for improving the administration of justice, see Pound, Law and Courts in China:
Progress in the Administration of Justice, 34 A.B.A.J. 275-76 (1948).
21. Yang Yuqing, supra note 18, at 13.
22. D. WIGDOR, supra note 19, at 277-78. See generally Pound, supra note 20.
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Marxist legal theorists, that the Chinese legal system should be one
with "Chinese characteristics." Nevertheless, Pound's Chinese critics
found that since his theory of law was a part of the pragmatic school,
it was to be condemned for its association with the Nationalists, and
therefore he, too, was to be criticized.23
The criticism of Pound was cursory compared to the fire concen-
trated on Hu Shi and the Nationalist legal theory with which he was
associated. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a Chinese philosopher, was educated
at Cornell and Columbia universities. Upon his return from studying
in the United States in 1917, Hu Shi sought to introduce pragmatism
into China.24 With this goal in mind, he invited John Dewey, his for-
mer teacher, to China in 1919.25 Dewey's two-year sojourn through-
out China resulted in a greatly enhanced enthusiasm for pragmatism
in the Chinese academic community, and it became quite popular in
the 1920s and 1930S.26 Although Hu Shi was influential in many
areas, he wrote little about law and his impact in the legal field was
not readily apparent. Nevertheless, in the 1950s, Chinese Marxists,
who condemned his role as a promoter of bourgeois pragmatism in
the general philosophical arena, arbitrarily extended their criticism of
him into the legal field as well.27
Ultimately, the campaign against legal pragmatism in the 1950s
accomplished little, if anything. This campaign failed primarily
because the dictates of Marxist ideology and the accompanying revo-
lutionary fervor prevented scholars and others from carrying out their
criticism in a dispassionate manner. As a result, scholars approached
their critique with presuppositions about the faultiness of "bourgeois"
Nationalist theory in general, and of pragmatism and Hu Shi's think-
23. See Yang Yuqing, supra note 18, at 14.
24. In the spring of 1919, Hu Shi delivered a series of lectures on pragmatism, and based
on these lectures he published a long article entitled Pragmatism, which systematically deals
with the development of pragmatism as a philosophy. Hu Shi, Shian Zhuyi 2 Hu SHI
WENcUN 409 (1919). Convinced that scholarly thinking should be scientific, he believed that
in philosophy, only pragmatism was scientific. Armed with the pragmatic method, Hu Shi
devoted himself mainly to a series of academic studies and occasionally to politics. His major
work in philosophy, History of Chinese Philosophy, appeared in 1919. Hu Siti, ZHONGGLO
ZHEXUE SHI DAGANG (1919). He also reexamined classical Chinese literature and
encouraged the use of vernacular in literary works. In 1921, he published his collection of
poetry, which was regarded as the beginning of new poetry in Chinese: Hu SHI, CHANO SHI Jl
(Experiments) (1921).
25. GENG YONGZHI, Hu SHi NIANPU (A Chronicle ofHu Shi) (1986). In a list of Amer-
iean pragmatic instrumentalists compiled by Professor Robert Summers, John Dewey was the
only one who was a professional philosopher and who was not a lawyer. Yet Dewey's contri-
butions to the philosophy of pragmatism were highly influential in the development of prag-
matic legal theory. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 22-23.
26. See ZHONGGUO JINDAI ZHUMING ZHEXUEJIA PINGZHUAN, supra note 18, at 25-27.
27. See ZHANG JINFAN, supra note 11, at 39; see generally Li Da, supra note 18 at 51.
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ing in particular. Chinese Marxist legal scholars of the 1950s did not
fully appreciate the theory of legal pragmatism that they were criticiz-
ing. Their criticism was less an attempt to understand legal pragma-
tism than a general refutation of all things Western and "bourgeois,"
including all institutions and ideas associated with Nationalist
thought.
B. Borrowing from the Soviet Model
Accompanying the campaign against legal pragmatism was a
large-scale adoption by China of Soviet legal institutions and Soviet
legal thought. Soviet advisors even helped the PRC government with
the task of building a new "socialist legality."2 The Soviet Union, as
the first socialist state, was viewed by China as a world leader in theo-
retical, political, economic, and legal development. It was natural
that the PRC, a newly proclaimed socialist state, should borrow from
the Soviet model. The Chinese studied translations of the works of
Soviet scholars in order to understand and develop a "socialist
legality."29
Chinese legal scholars at the time were greatly interested in the
work done by A.Y. Vyshinsky, a Soviet legal scholar of the 1930s,
especially his definition of law, his typology of law, and his discussion
on joint offenders. 30 The Soviet legal classification system, Soviet
legal terminology, and even Soviet textbooks soon became familiar in
law schools and legal departments across China.3'
From the outset, however, the adoption of Soviet-style legal insti-
tutions was qualified. Chinese leaders took the pragmatic approach of
selective adoption, aiming to adapt elements of the Soviet model to
the unique Chinese experience. This approach required that they
choose from and imitate those parts of the Soviet model that they felt
met the needs of the ongoing political struggle in China. Of the lead-
ing Soviet legal theorists at the time, Vyshinsky appealed most to the
pragmatic Chinese leaders.32 Vyshinsky stressed the coercive aspect
of law and regarded law as the instrument used by the ruling class to
suppress antagonistic forces.33 Chinese leaders in the 1950s, like those
28. Wu Jianfan, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1; MacDonald, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 313.
29. Michael, The Role of Law in Traditional, National and Communist China, CHINA Q.
125, 136 (1962). For general discussions of Soviet legal systems, Fee J. HAZARD & 1. SHAPIRO,
THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM (1962); E. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET LEGAL
SYSTEM (1969); G. GUINS, SOVIET LAW AND SOVIET SOCIETY (1954).
30. Zhang Shanzu, An Yang Weixingsii dui Falti Kexue de Zhuoyue Gongxian,
ZHENGFA YANJIu, April 1955, at 51.
31. MacDonald, Legal Education in China Today, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 324 (1980).
32. See Zhang Shanzu, supra note 30, at 55.
33. For a discussion of Vyshinsky, see H. KELSEN, supra note 4, at 116-132. In the early
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of the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 1940s, promoted a policy of
class struggle. Convinced that law could be appropriately used as an
instrument, Chinese legal scholars adopted Vyshinsky's model of legal
theory. The choice of Vyshinsky's theory illustrates the beginnings of
the Chinese-style pragmatic approach in law.
Although China has not looked to the Soviet model since 1960,
its influence remains strong today, especially in its theoretical under-
pinnings. For example, the definition of the term "law" found in a
1984 Chinese legal dictionary is strikingly similar to one formulated
by Vyshinsky in 1938. The Chinese dictionary defines law as "the
aggregate of the rules of conduct enacted and approved by the state,
expressing the will of the dominant class, the application of which is
guaranteed by the coercive force of the state."' In comparison,
Vyshinsky defined law as:
the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will of
the dominant class and established in legal order, as well as
of customs and rules of community life confirmed by state
authority, the application whereof is guaranteed by the coer-
cive force of the state to the end of safeguarding, making
secure and developing social relationships and arrangements
advantageous and agreeable to the dominant class. 35
Another example of the lasting influence of the Soviet model is
the retention of the Leninist notion that the Communist party, as van-
guard of the proletariat, has the role of leading class struggle and
guaranteeing the socialist transition. Despite the fact that the notion
of class struggle rarely appears in political discussion today, the CCP
still views itself as the vanguard of the PRC and is thus able to main-
tain its supreme authority in today's China.
III. ELEMENTS OF CHINESE LEGAL PRAGMATISM
In the decades following the initial legal developments discussed
above, Chinese legal scholars have further developed what they call
Marxist legal theory, despite the fact that Marx and Engels never for-
mulated a systematic theory of law. This theory is summarized by the
following excerpt:
As is well known, the conventional legal theory in our coun-
30s, Pashukanis' ideas were predominant in Soviet legal circles, but in 1937 he was renounced
and criticized. In the process of criticizing Pashukanis, Vyshinsky developed his own legal
theory. Id
34. FAXUE CIDIAN (Jurisprudence Dictionary) (revised ed. 1984).
35. SoviE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 336 (H. W. Babb trans. 1951).
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try is a theoretical system which is constructed by regarding
antagonistic class relations as the basic elements, and which
holds that "the existence of law rests on class and class
struggle." According to this theory, (1) the origin of law -
"law is an outcome of irreconcilable class struggle," (2) the
essence of law-"law is an expression of the will of the rul-
ing class," (3) the function of law - "law is an instrument
with which the ruling class exercises its rule," (4) the devel-
opment of law-"law will wither away with the disappear-
ance of class." Furthermore, it holds that "law is a
phenomenon unique to societies with classes." Because
statements of the founders of Marxism about law were fre-
quently quoted as "theoretical bases" for the theory, it has
always been called Marxist legal theory and has been occu-
pying predominant position in our legal field.36
The teaching of this Marxist legal theory comprises the primary
prerequisite course of a legal education in China today.37 The theory
taught in schools, however, remains largely dogmatic, overly general,
and distant from the needs of contemporary China. The aims of
China's current legalization campaign - to build legal institutions,
legislate a comprehensive body of law, and instill legal consciousness
- stand in sharp contrast to the Marxist theory of the classroom.
Moreover, these changes have been accompanied by the pragmatic
approach taken by political leaders when dealing with today's reali-
ties. The divergence between the ideological abstractions of theory
and the pragmatic approach to concrete day-to-day legal activities
characterizes the Chinese legal scene today. This divergence has
fueled recent jurisprudential debates in China. Since 1978, scholars
have debated the class nature of law, the validity of current Marxist
legal theory in China, and which direction the new "socialist legal
theory with Chinese characteristics" should take.
The participants in these debates can be split into two different
camps: one conservative, the other radical. The conservatives,
largely composed of well-established political leaders, scholars, and
other legal notables, maintain that the classical or conventional Marx-
ist legal theory is scientific, correct, and unshakable. 38 They believe
36. Du Feijing & Wang Yongqing, Makesi Zhuyi yu Faxue, ZHONGGUO FAXUE, Feb.
1988, at 19 (quoted material is unattributed).
37. Although it is unclear exactly what contributions Mao has made to theory, the the-
ory devised by Chinese legal scholars is said to contain elements of both "Marxism-Leninism"
and "Mao Zedong thought." For Mao's ideas about law, see MAO ZEDONG SIXIANG FAXuE
LILUN LUNWENXUAN (Selected Papers on Legal Theory of Mao Zedong Thought) (1985).
38. See Li Maoguan, Guanyu Fa de Benzhi Shuxin de Tantao, ZHONGouo FAXUE, Jan.
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that the class nature of law is the very characteristic by which Marxist
legal theory gains its identity and that Marxist legal theory has revo-
lutionized the philosophy of law.
On the other hand, the radicals, usually young scholars and
occasionally well-known professors, do not agree that current Marxist
legal theory in China has developed by combining basic principles of
Marxism with the Chinese experience. 39 According to the radicals,
Chinese Marxist legal theory only imitates Soviet legal theory formed
and developed over four decades ago. In their view, legal studies
today should concentrate on problems that need urgent attention -
problems arising from the current reforms. Legal scholars, they add,
should not confine themselves to the dogmatic methodology and rhet-
oric of the founders of Marxism. Instead, legal scholars should con-
centrate their efforts towards developing an innovative theory of
Marxism truly suited to the Chinese situation.
The pragmatic approach towards developing a legal system in
China has never been systematically explained by Chinese leaders or
legal scholars. However, it plays a critical role in the legalization
campaign in China today, as demonstrated in many statements made
by political leaders. In addition, although the pragmatic approach
largely responds to practical day-to-day needs, it also draws upon
some of the basic tenets of Marxist legal dogma whenever theoretical
justification is necessary.40 Some theorists contend that Chinese
Marxist legal theory is the outcome of practice that combines Marxist
principles about law with Chinese actuality in light of the spirit of
"seeking truth from fact."'" However, as will be shown, the approach
towards legalization is actually purely pragmatic, and despite much
rhetoric, Marxist theory is largely ignored. It is ironic, therefore, that
PRC legal scholars began in the early years by criticizing legal prag-
matism and ended up adopting many of its basic tenets.
The Chinese pragmatic approach is manifest in the following
characteristics: 1) it overemphasizes instrumental facets of law, 2) it
regards law as an outcome of actuality, 3) it treats law as a servant of
1988, at 23; Guo Yuzhao, Fa de Jiben Gainian de Zai Tantao, ZHONGGUO FAXuE, Feb. 1988,
at 29.
39. See Zhang Zonghou, Faxue Lilun Bixu Biange he Gexin, ZHoNGC;uo FA.WE, Jan.
1988, at 29; Du Paofu, Lun Fa de Benzhi, ZHONGGUO FAXuE, Mar. 1988, at 37; Du Feijing,
supra note 36, at 18.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
41. "Seeking truth from fact" is descriptive of a working style or attitude proposed by
Mao Zedong and carried on by the successive CCP leaders. This style requires people to be
practical and realistic but not subjective or idealistic in their work and life. More recently,
Deng Xiaoping has adopted the term as a means of urging a move away from ideological
argument.
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policy, and 4) it does not treat individual legal rights seriously. As is
shown below, these four characteristics are often camouflaged by and
justified with Marxist dogma, while, in fact, they exist purely for prag-
matic purposes.
Despite Marxist doctrine and past warnings against pragmatism,
the Chinese legal system is developing pursuant to a purely pragmatic
approach. For both Marxists and pragmatists, law is an instrument of
the CCP. Theoretically, after establishing "actuality" (explained
below), the CCP uses this instrument to legislate appropriate policy.
Rights, as separate from and independent of duties, have no place in
this process. Ultimately, since the purpose of law is to implement
CCP policy, all enactment and revision of legislation follows the dic-
tates of policy. The content of all law, therefore, is, in essence, an
exact replication of CCP policy.
A. Law as an Instrument
Instrumentalism is a prominent component of both Marxist
dogma and the pragmatic approach to legalization. Instrumentalists
see law as an instrument for shaping society. Since 1949, this view has
gone through two major stages. Immediately after the founding of the
PRC, the CCP was primarily concerned with the extermination of
antagonistic forces, seizure of national political power, and consolida-
tion of victory.42 Its goal at that time was to establish the proletarian
dictatorship.43 The CCP, as vanguard of the proletariat, was to lead
society towards socialism. Extermination of antagonistic forces was
considered critical to reaching this objective. Law was regarded as an
instrument for class domination, an instrument that would allow the
proletariat to dominate and thereby eventually extinguish the bour-
geois class and all other reactionaries."
Leaders thought law as an instrument should: 1) affirm and regu-
late the relationship between the ruling class and the ruled classes and
between the oppressors and the oppressed, and suppress the resistance
42. See MAO TSETUNG (Mao Zedong), On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among the People, in 5 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG 384 (1977); MAO TSETUNG, On
the People's Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG 411 (1969).
43. MAO TSETUNG, On New Democracy, in 2 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSETUNG 339
(1967); MAO TSETUNG, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, supra note 42, at 412; MAO
TSETUNG, New-Democratic Constitutional Government, in 2 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSETUNG, supra, at 407.
44. FAXUE JICHu LILUN (A Basic Theory of Law) 181-189 (1984). The use of law as an
instrument in today's China, although stemming from a different theoretical basis, is consistent
with the traditional notion of law as an instrument of dominance. In fact, the Chinese leaders
have unconsciously returned to such a traditional notion as they currently employ law in an
instrumental fashion.
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of the ruled classes; 2) affirm and regulate the relationship between
the ruling class and its alliance; and 3) affirm and regulate the internal
relations of the ruling class.4 5 In the early years of political struggle,
instrumentalism justified large scale suppression of "reactionaries"
consistent with the stated purpose of suppressing the resistance of the
ruled classes. Later, during the Great Leap Forward and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the absence of legal order high-
lighted the instrumental approach to law. Since law was only a tool,
it was used only when necessary or desirable. These latter periods of
class struggle emphasized extra-legal methods, and thus left the legal
instrument aside.
As the political focus has moved from class struggle towards eco-
nomic development, the primary role of law as an instrument has
changed from serving class struggle to serving economic development.
The CCP decided in December 1978 to shift the work priority from
class struggle to economic development. Since then it has pursued a
series of new economic policies designed to invigorate the internal
economy and open China to the outside world.46
Thus, law is now an instrument serving the goal of economic
development. Leaders have justified this change in CCP policy by
concluding that "class struggle is no longer vital, since the exploiting
class [in China] has been exterminated." 47 Law's instrumental role in
the service of economic development is illustrated by the current CCP
policy that all government leaders and economic units must use legal
means, supplemented by other means, to maintain economic order.48
The Marxist doctrinal justification for this new policy is sketchy.
Theorists appear to reason that since the CCP retains its role as van-
guard of the proletariat, its decisions are consistent with leading
45. Id at 30-32.
46. See ZHONGGONG DANGSHI DASHi NIANBIAO 421 (1987). See also Communique of
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China, trans in Hsinhua News Agency, News Bulletin, Dec. 26, 1978, at 59, which states:
While we have achieved political stability and unity and are restoring and adhering
to the economic policies that proved effective over a long time, we are now, in the
light of the new historical conditions and practical experience, adopting a number of
major new economic measures, conscientiously transforming the system and meth-
ods of economic management, actively expanding economic cooperation on terms of
equality and mutual benefit with other countries on the basis of self-reliance, striving
to adopt the world's advanced technologies and equipment, and greatly strengthen-
ing scientific and educational work to meet the needs of modernization.
47. See Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding
of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11 th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981), transM in BEUING REv., July
6, 1981, at 37.
48. See FAXUE GAILUN (An Introduction to Law) 227 (1981).
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China further down the path toward socialism. Moreover, theorists
and political leaders use new slogans, like "socialism with Chinese
characteristics," to legitimize the new policy.
B. Law as an Outcome of Actuality
For Chinese Marxist legal scholars, law is neither divinely
endowed nor does it have anything to do with nature. These scholars
rarely talk about such abstract values as "rationality" and "justice."
Law is not understood in the context of relations between law and
morality and rights and freedom as it is in many Western countries.
The only source for law is "actuality" (sh/i) as determined by the
CCP. "Actuality" is relied on, almost ritualistically, as a justification
for all legislation. In the early years, the CCP deemed that the "actu-
ality" of class struggle was paramount. Now, the CCP perceives gen-
eral economic construction as the guiding "actuality. 4 9  The
relationship between "actuality" and law, while largely descriptive,
seems to have become an essential component of Chinese Marxist
legal theory. Actuality, moreover, is tied with the idea of "objective"
(keguan de) determination of "actuality" and of the needs of
development.
1. Doctrine
a. Actuality the Mother, Law the Child
Peng Zhen, the former Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress of China, and a leader in the legal
field, once offered this colloquy: "Is law subordinate to actuality or
actuality to law? Who is the mother? Who are the children? Actual-
ity is the mother. It produces law. Law and theories of law are the
children."50 Some legal scholars echoed this idea: "It is actuality and
only actuality that is the source and foundation of law."'" Peng
Zhen's statement about law and "actuality" exemplifies today's prag-
matic approach to legalization. The open-ended vagueness of the
word "actuality" serves as'an easy means to justify all actions.
Thus, because of this concept, those in the position to determine
"actuality" possess a powerful means with which to make law and
direct the course of social development. The outcome of such power
can be desirable or catastrophic to society at large. For example, on
49. See ZHONGGONG DANGSHI DASH! NIANBIAO, supra note 46, at 422.
50. Speech by Peng Zhen, Fazhan Shehui Zhuyi Minzhu, Jianquan Shehuizhuyi Fazhi
(Promoting Socialist Democracy and Perfecting Socialist Legality) (July 22, 1982), reprinted in
FAXUE ZAZHI, May 1982, at 5, 6.
51. FAXUE JICHU LILUN, supra note 13, at 345.
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the positive side, the "actuality" of the need for economic develop-
ment has produced a series of laws that to date have been markedly
successful in bringing foreign investment and foreign technology into
China, as well as in stimulating internal growth. On the other hand,
the "actuality" of the need to quicken the pace towards socialism led
Mao to carry out the Cultural Revolution. More recently, sudden
and arbitrary crackdowns on economic crime have been justified by
pointing to the "actuality" of a rising threat to socialist society posed
by bourgeois crimes.52
b. The role of "objectivity" in actuality
The view that "actuality" produces law derives in part from
Marxist ideas about the need for continual legal reform. Chinese
Marxist legal scholars believe that at each stage of social development
laws appropriate to the adjustment of social relations in that stage of
development must be enacted. Only then can there be harmony and
consistency between the different laws and regulations and society.5 3
When changes arise in society, the law should change to reharmonize
the internal relations within society.54 Thus, they believe that:
Socialist law must develop and change in accordance with
the development and change of economic, political, cultural
and other conditions. This kind of change is embodied in
the legislative process, where, in order to adapt to the objec-
tive needs of development, the process of enactment, revi-
sion, and abrogation of laws and regulations is continuously
undertaken. (emphasis added)"5
"Actuality" produces law that "adapt[s] to the objective needs of
development." 6 It remains unclear, however, how one determines
"actuality," or when a changed "actuality" warrants legal reform.
"Actuality," apparently, is situational changes and needs. These situ-
ational changes and needs, moreover, are apparently "objective" and
determined "objectively." Still, other than the vague concept of
"actuality" in Peng Zhen's statement, or the idea of changing to meet
52. See, eg.. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Yancheng
Yanzhong Pohuai Jingji de Zuifan de Jueding (Resolution of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Severely Punishing Those Who Commit Crimes that Seriously
Sabotage the Economy) in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALO HUIBIAN (A Collection
of Laws of the People's Republic of China) 382 (1984).
53. FA DE JIBEN LILUN (A Basic Theory of Law) 294-95 (Ma Zhuyan, Shao Cheng, &
Zhao Changsheng eds. 1987).
54. Id.
55. See FAXUE JICHU LILUN, supra note 13, at 350.
56. Id
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the objective needs of development articulated by Marxist doctrine,
no key has been provided for knowing how "actuality" is determined.
What is clear is that only the CCP is ultimately capable of assessing
the "objective" needs for development and determining that "actual-
ity" warrants legal reform. 7
2. The Changing Constitution and Actuality
The frequent revision of the Chinese constitution reflects the
changing "objective" determination by the CCP of "actuality." The
PRC has promulgated four constitutions (in 1954, 1975, 1978, and
1982). Each of these four constitutions bears the mark of the political
and economic environment in which it was produced. For example,
the central political "actuality" of the early 1950s - the transition to
a socialist state - was reflected in the provisions of the 1954 constitu-
tion. 8 Similarly, the 1975 "Gang of Four" constitution was strongly
influenced by the "actuality" of the Cultural Revolution, and thus
"the proletariat [was to] exercise all-round dictatorship over the bour-
geoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture."59
The new political "actuality" that led to the downfall of the
Gang of Four necessarily also led to the need to revise the 1975 con-
stitution. The new 1978 constitution brought back some of the princi-
ples of the 1954 constitution, laid out the new goal of "the four
modernizations," and emphasized promotion of socialist democracy
and elevation of science and education.60 Even as early as late 1978,
when, at the Third Plenary Session of the 1 lth Congress of the CCP,
the present political and economic reforms were born, 61 leaders real-
ized that yet another revision of the constitution was needed. Writing
in 1982, when the new constitution was promulgated, Peng Zhen
explained: "As the 1978 constitution cannot meet the needs of the
current situation, fairly big revisions [were] made this time."'62 Even
though the 1982 constitution was regarded by some as "the best of the
57. One leading Chinese legal scholar says: "Our people's democratic legal system
should not be something prematurely and subjectively worked out. It must be gradually devel-
oped and perfected, from simplicity to complexity, in accordance with the 'actuality' and the
objective requirements of political and economic development." FAXUE GAILUN ZILIAO
XUANBIAN (Reference Material for an Introduction to the Science of Law) 107-108 (1984).
58. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (The Constitution of the People's
Republic of China) preamble (1954).
59. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (The Constitution of the People's
Republic of China) art. 12 (1975).
60. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (The Constitution of the People's
Republic of China) preamble (1978).
61. See generally ZHONGGONG DANGSHI DASHI NIANBIAO, supra note 46.
62. See Peng Zhen, Explanations on the Draft of the Revised Constitution ofthe People's
Republic of China, BEIJING REVIEW, May 10, 1982, at 16.
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four,"6 3 changed "actuality," including the emergence of the private
economy, required amendment in 1988.64
3. Legislation and Actuality
In the past forty years, the view that "actuality" produces law
has played a significant role in Chinese legislative development. An
overview of PRC legislation during this period helps to illustrate this
idea. Beginning in 1949, upon the abrogation of the old Six Laws of
the Nationalists, the legal work was to be conducted "in accordance
with the new laws of the people."' 65 These new laws did not as yet
exist; they had to be created. The 1949 PRC government determined
that the most urgent "actuality" at the time was the task of establish-
ing the state machinery which was considered an essential component
of the new proletarian dictatorship. Consequently, a series of laws
and regulations pertinent to institutional arrangements was promul-
gated.6 6 Later, in April 1952, when the leadership perceived that cor-
ruption was rife, this new "actuality" led to the enactment of anti-
corruption legislation.67 Law continued, in subsequent years, to be
enacted according to the "actuality" as the PRC government deter-
mined it existed.
Late in 1978, the CCP decided that the preeminent "actuality" at
that time was the need for domestic economic reform and develop-
ment and a corresponding opening to foreign investment and trade.69
This new "actuality" has necessitated more laws to encourage invest-
ment, protect investors, and introduce various market mechanisms
63. See generally Cao Haibo, Disi Bu Xianfa Jiang Shi Ioguo Zuihao de Yibu Xianfa, in
ZHANG YOUYU ET AL, 2 XIANFA LUNWEN JI (Essays on the Constitution) 16 (1982).
64. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONs-rrruTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(April 1988).
65. See Instructions, supra note 14.
66. See, eg., Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Gongtong Gangling (Com-
mon Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) (1949). in
ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU FALING HUIBIAN (1949-1950) (A Collection of Lai and
Decrees of the Central Peoples Government 1949-1950) (1980); Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zuzhi Fa (Organic Law of the National People's
Congress of the PRC) (1954), in ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU FALING HuiBiAN (1954-
1955) 111-18 (1980); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Zuzhi Fa (Organic Law of
the State Council of the PRC), in idL, at 123-32; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin
Yanchayuan Zuzhi Fa (Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates of the PRC) (1954), in it,
at 133-38.
67. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengzhi Tanwu Tiaoli (Regulations of the People's
Republic of China for Punishing Corruption) (April 1952), in ZHONGYANG REN& N
ZHENGFU FALING HUIBIAN (1952) 29-32 (1980). For a brief discussion of the drafting of this
regulation, see FAXUE JICHU LILUN, supra note 13, at 195-96.
68. See generally ZHONGGONG DANGSHI DASHI NIANBIAO, supra note 46.
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into the economy. 69 Thus, economic law, in particular, has expanded
rapidly in response to the demands of the current "actuality." China
has gone through a complete cycle since 1949. For the first years
after "liberation," except for the largest industries, much of the
existing smaller private enterprise was allowed to remain. By the
later 1950s, however, almost all of these sectors had been nationalized
or collectivized. The response to the new "actuality" now requires a
renewed privatization of certain sectors of the Chinese economy.
4. Administration and Actuality
"Actuality" also influences the administration of law in China.
One pertinent example is in the area of law enforcement, where the
punishment meted out for a particular crime varies with the political
"actuality" at the time. If a criminal is so unfortunate as to be cap-
tured during an anti-crime campaign, he may receive the maximum
punishment provided by the law, when the facts of his particular case
might normally result in a lesser punishment but for the anti-crime
campaign. When leaders are satisfied with the political and economic
situation, lighter criminal penalties are likely to be imposed. Per-
ceived instability leads to heavier penalties.7" Thus, criminal penal-
ties are determined by official perceptions of current "actuality,"
despite recent efforts to standardize the sentencing of criminals.
C. Law as a Servant of Policy
Assuming "actuality" is the mother of law, we must pursue fur-
ther how "actuality" produces law. The medium which is needed to
give effect to this "actuality" is none other than the fundamental prin-
ciples and specific policies proclaimed by the CCP. Peng Zhen has
supported this proposition: "What is law? Law is the finalization of
69. See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (Law of
the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment)
(promulgated July 8, 1979), trans. in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (CCH) q 6-500
[hereinafter CHINA L. FOR. Bus.]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Hetong Fa (Eco-
nomic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China) (adopted Dec. 13, 1981), trans. in id.
at 5-500; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China) (adopted Dec. 13, 198 1), trans. in id. at 1
32-500; Gongshang Qiye Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (Regulations on Registration and Administra-
tion of Industrial and Commercial Enterprises) (adopted July 7, 1982), reprinted in JINGJI
FAGUI XUANBIAN 67 (1984); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa
Shishi Tiaoli (Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment) (promulgated Sept. 20, 1983,
amended Jan. 15, 1986), trans. in CHINA L. FOR. Bus., supra, at 6-550; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Shewai Jingji Hetong Fa (Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China) (adopted Mar. 21, 1985), trans. in id. at 5-550.
70. FA DE JIBEN LILUN, supra note 53, at 324-25.
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the Party's fundamental principles and specific policies. That is, it
fixes the Party's fundamental principles and specific policies in legal
form."
71
Thus, through "actuality," all law is inextricably linked with
CCP policy. The recent dramatic but smooth change from the view
that law is an instrument of class struggle to the view that law is an
instrument of economic development illustrates this link. The CCP
first determines "actuality," then, through the medium of policy,
promulgates appropriate laws and regulations. Scholars and political
leaders have frequently debated the relationship between policy and
law, but the dominant view still holds that CCP policy is the soul and
foundation of law and contains the guiding principles for legislation.72
The purpose of law is only "to finalize, stipulate, and standardize
that policy of the party which has proven correct and effective." 73
What is "correct and effective" is necessarily determined by the CCP.
Anything inconsistent with the policy of the CCP is therefore neither
correct nor effective. The process is simple: begin with CCP policy,
articulate it into legal form, and the result is law. "Socialist law is an
important and necessary tool for realization of the party's policy,"
observes one legal scholar. "It plays a particular and active role in the
implementation of party policy." 74 Thus, law is always an expression
of policy and has no independent status of its own.
In addition, the articulation of CCP policy into legal form bol-
sters the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. Standing alone,
CCP policy is enforced by the disciplinary power of the party organi-
zation. Once clothed with the coercive power of the state and the
universal applicability of law, it becomes even more powerful.
D. Treatment of Individual Rights
Overemphasis on the instrumental facets of law and on the
notion that policy is the basis for law naturally and necessarily has led
to the neglect of many fundamental jurisprudential categories. As
mentioned earlier, discussions about "rationality" and "justice" are
not found in contemporary Chinese legal theory, let alone studies of
"rights." Discussion in the classroom setting centers only on general
Marxist ideas; in the political setting it centers only on practical appli-
cation. In neither case are rights treated seriously.
71. See Peng Zhen, Guanyu Qige FalN Coaan de Shuoming, in FAXtUE GAILUN ZIuAO
XUANBIAN, supra note 57, at 160.
72. See FAXUE JICHU LILUN, supra note 13, at 216-21.
73. Peng Zhen, supra note 71.
74. See FAXUE JICHu LILUN, supra note 13, at 219-220.
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It cannot be said, however, that there is absolutely no mention of
the word "rights" (quanli) in Chinese legal theory. Chinese Marxist
legal scholars link "rights" of citizens with their "duties" (iwu) to
the state. There are at least three features of the Chinese Marxist
concept of rights. First, it is believed that rights bear elements of a
class nature, and that a distinction can be drawn between bourgeois
and proletarian rights.75 Bourgeois rights, by definition, protect the
bourgeois and not the proletarian class. Similarly, proletarian rights
serve the interest of their class. Second, Chinese Marxists argue that
abstract or natural rights have never existed. A right is not inherent
or inalienable, but rather something granted by the State and the
dominant class. Legal rights are not a reflection of natural rights as
they are in some Western legal systems, but rather, they are derived
from citizenship. This concept of rights is inextricably linked to the
notion that rights are granted by the state and are not inalienable.
Since the state is capable of granting rights, then, undoubtedly, it is
also capable of taking them back or changing them as it deems
necessary.
Third, Chinese Marxist legal scholars believe rights are invaria-
bly qualified and incomplete. In their view, rights are not absolute,
but relative, and must be accompanied by duties. They believe that
there is no right that does not call for a duty, nor is there any duty
that does not lead to a right. While you enjoy certain rights, you have
a certain duty to perform and vice versa. A law textbook explains:
Rights and duties, as two inseparable aspects forming the
substance of a legal relation, exist in the whole (unity) of
such legal relation. They are contradictory as well as uni-
fied. By "contradictory," it is meant that the two are quite
different, have different meanings and different natures, and
therefore shall not be confused. By "unified," it is meant
that the two come into being simultaneously, are closely
associated with and conditioned upon each other, and com-
plement each other.76
Thus, the 1982 constitution stipulates that "[e]very citizen is entitled
to the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed
by the Constitution and the law."" Law is understood, therefore, not
as having the function of protecting rights. Instead, it is used both to
grant and to restrict rights.
75. See id. at 386.
76. See FAXUE JIcHu LILUN, supra note 13, at 390.
77. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA (The Constitution of the People's
Republic of China) art. 33 (1982).
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Although there are many and varying interpretations of the con-
cept of fights, these discussions are largely abstract. Chinese
pragmatists see little practical or concrete use for such abstract fights
in, for instance, creating social institutions or regulating the relation-
ship between individuals and the government. In fact, rights that
derived from something other than a grant from the state would con-
siderably interfere with the freedom with which the CCP carries out
its policies.
IV. CRITIQUE OF CHINESE LEGAL PRAGMATISM
As discussed, in today's China, the approach to the development
of a legal system is purely pragmatic. This pragmatic approach is
unacceptable. In all legal systems a certain amount of pragmatism is
inevitable and necessary, for legislation is generally enacted in
response to a situation that is thought to demand it. In an increas-
ingly pragmatic world, the advantages and disadvantages of legal
pragmatism are open to much debate. But in the particular instance
of China, a purely pragmatic approach is most certainly harmful to
the development of a comprehensive and stable legal order.
The adoption by Chinese Marxists of pragmatic approaches does
not conflict, in their minds, with their own doctrine about the role of
law. Marxists are both idealistic and pragmatic at the same time.
They are idealists when they take an abstract and long term view of
history and law; they are pragmatists when they are engaged in con-
crete and practical efforts. Marxists believe, for instance, that eventu-
ally the state, and with it the law, will wither away. In practice, a
large network of laws and legal institutions is being built. In reality,
this practice, which stands in sharp contrast to ideology, makes it
increasingly less likely that the final outcome of this lawmaking will
be a lawless society, which is a Marxist goal. Admittedly, many legal
systems take a pragmatic approach and make use of the instrumental
facets of law. However, the role of pragmatism in those legal systems
differs in one crucial respect from its role in China. In the United
States, for instance, pragmatism exists within the context of an estab-
lished, sophisticated legal system, built on constant and inviolable
principles. It is a society founded on the rule of law. In China, the
emphasis on the instrumental facets of law lacks a similar foundation.
Instead, tradition and Marxist dogma combine to promote an instru-
mentalist concept that affords virtually unlimited power to "proleta-
rian" leaders to use law towards whatever ends they choose.
"Actuality" and "objectivity" are the major factors in the failure
to bring about the rule of law in China. In Chinese jurisprudence all
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decisions are said to be objective. Thus, all legislation is justified as
being the "objective" result of "actuality." '78 But Chinese legal prag-
matism regards "actuality," as determined by the "objective" evalua-
tion of the CCP, as the only standard for making and revising law.
The broad majority of people who are not in a position to determine
"actuality" do not have confidence in the law. For this reason, extra-
legal settlement of disputes is preferred by many people. Even though
China has already enacted many new laws, established new legal insti-
tutions, and implemented a publicity campaign promoting legal
knowledge, indifference to law remains strong.
People's indifference to and mistrust of law can only be reversed
with the creation of a true legal consciousness. Creating this legal con-
sciousness necessarily involves bringing citizens into the process of
making law and building legal institutions that can be relied upon,
which are important components of the transformation from a society
ruled by men to a society ruled by law.7 9 Moreover, confidence in the
new legal order can become complete only if people are convinced
that the law equally binds and protects every individual. In this con-
nection, a good understanding of the concept of rights will help foster
a healthy legal consciousness. The importance and scope of this task
has been neither fully understood nor adequately addressed in China.
The stated aim of creating a legal consciousness has been frus-
trated thus far by the CCP's persistence in relying on the instrumental
function of law. Because only the CCP can make an "objective"
determination of the "actuality" that is the source of policy, CCP pol-
icy and PRC law have become indistinguishable. Chinese legal
pragmatists neglect the importance of the stability created out of last-
ing legal principles characteristic of societies which have instituted the
rule of law. The continued pursuit of a purely pragmatic approach to
legalization may have appeal in the short run - and the current eco-
nomic and political reformers surely have benefited from its inherent
flexibility - but, in the long run, it will undercut the goal of building
a stable legal order.
CONCLUSION
If China expects to develop a lasting legal order, it must abandon
pragmatism as it exists today. If the CCP continues to treat law
merely as an instrument of policy, the establishment of the authority
of law will remain illusive. To establish this authority, law must be
78. See FA DE JIBEN LILUN, supra note 53, at 294-95.
79. See Liu Xin, Renzhiyu Shehuizhuyi Fazhi Buneng Xiang Jiehe, in FAZHI Yu RENZIm
WENTI TAOLUN J1 (Discussions of the Question of Rule by Law and Rule by Man) 88 (1981).
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freed from the bondage of policy. At the same time, legal theorists
must strive to develop a working theory of law that can serve as the
true core of a comprehensive legal system.
Foremost among the tasks intrinsic to this goal is a thorough
review of the basic jurisprudential categories common to many for-
eign legal systems that have been largely overlooked by many Chinese
theorists until now. The role of individual rights and principles of
legal justice will be one necessary focus of any such review. Any
future pragmatic use of law must be strictly circumscribed by perma-
nent principles that will remain relatively constant regardless of the
direction of statutory reform. Failing this, the construction of a new
legal order will remain an illusion that can be easily swept away by
the change in direction of the current of any future policy.

